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Chapter 2. Metaphysical explanations.
Section 1. Leibniz’s clarification of the concepts of
substance and representation
The publication of Leibniz’s "New system of nature etc."
invoked several critical reactions, to which Leibniz replied.
One of his replies was published in the "Journal des savants"
of November 1696.
In this text, Leibniz holds that there are only three ways
in which substances can communicate. The first is by way of
influence, the second by way of assistance, the third by way
of pre-established harmony. To clarify this, Leibniz introdu-
ces the metaphor of the synchronical clocks.
Assume, Leibniz says, two clocks which are running perfect-
ly synchronically; how is this to be explained? One can, as
did Huygens in a famous experiment, attach two pendulums at
opposite sides of a piece of wood; then, even if one purposely
makes the pendulums swing in a different rhythm at first,
eventually they will batter the piece of wood at the same
time, synchronically. The explanation for this is, according
to Leibniz, that the trembling of the particles of the wood
demands a specific order which is communicated in the batte-
ring as a reaction of the wood on the pendulum (G.IV, p. 500).
This is the view of the common philosophy, Leibniz states, but
it must be rejected since:
"[...] on ne sçauroit concevoir des particules
materielles, ny des especes ou qualités immaterielles,
qui puissent passer de l’une de ces substances dans
l’autre [...]."
(G.IV, p. 501)
([...] one cannot conceive of material particles, nor
of species or immaterial qualities, which can pass
from one of these substances into the other [...].)
The second way to synchronize the clocks is to have somebo-
dy standing by them and adjust their movement every moment.
This assistance is exactly what the Occasionalists propose,
and it must be rejected since:
"[...] je tiens que c’est faire venir Deum ex machina,
dans une chose naturelle et ordinaire, oú selon la
raison il ne doit intervenir que de la maniere qu’il
concourt à toutes les autres choses de la nature."
(G.IV, p. 501)
([...] I hold that this is making use of a Deus ex
machina, in a natural and ordinary thing, where accor-
ding to reason it should not intervene but in a way in
which it concurs with all other things of nature.)
It should be observed here, that Leibniz does not reject the
intervening of God, but holds that this must be universal and
natural instead of occasional and miraculous (34).
The third way to synchronize the clocks is simply to con-
struct them that way - thus they cannot but run synchronical-
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ly. This is Leibniz’s pre-established harmony (G.IV, p. 501).
It is the very concept which was penetratingly criticized by
Pierre Bayle in his "Dictionnaire historique et critique"
appearing in 1697. Leibniz published his first reply to Bayle
in the "Histoire des ouvrages des savants" of July 1698 (G.IV,
pp. 517 ff). In the second edition of his Dictionnaire Bayle
maintained his criticism, and again Leibniz made a reply, this
time published in Masson’s "Histoire critique de la république
des lettres" in 1702. These two replies are of outstanding
quality; they clearly show the consistency of Leibniz’s sy-
stem, especially as concerns the concepts of pre-established
harmony and substances. I will review them below.
In his first reply to Bayle (1698), Leibniz examines the
criticism of his opponent which could be condensed to one
question: what is Leibniz’s concept of causality? Bayle seems
to reason as follows. Assuming for argument’s sake that a
substantial form or soul 1) contains everything that will
happen, but 2) is simple and indivisible; then one may conclu-
de that 1) the ’real’ or physical world (i.e. the material
bodies) is superfluous, since anything can happen to the souls
independently of their bodies, and that 2) there is no speci-
fic cause of change in a soul, since it is simple; but then,
as a consequence, nothing can change a substantial form or
soul and this makes it a useless concept, or, if a miracle
does change a soul, the concept does not differ from the
Occasionalist point of view.
Leibniz’s answer is the following; Bayle is wrong, firstly,
"Car puisque la nature de L’ame a esté faite d’abord
d’une
maniere propre à se representer successivement les
changemens de la matiere, le cas qu’on suppose ne
sçauroit arriver dans l’ordre naturel."
(G.IV, p. 519)
(For since the nature of the soul has been made from
the beginning in a way which is proper for represen-
ting successively the changes of matter, the occasion
one supposes [i.e. that a body would feel or act inde-
pendently] could not arise in the natural order.)
Obviously, Bayle has confused mechanical independency with
independency as such. In fact, Leibniz says, the souls and
bodies are interdependent, since the former must represent the
latter (if there were no material world, there would be no
substantial forms of it) and the latter must present the point
of view to the former. Leibniz refers here to the circular
structure of his system (see also chapter 1, section 4).
Secondly, Bayle is wrong in concluding that there is no
specific cause of change in a substantial form, and also in
concluding that these forms cannot change. Mechanically it
would be impossible for anything to change unless something
external causes it to change; but to formulate this principle
completely correctly one must state, says Leibniz, that a
thing will persevere in its state unless it is caused to do
otherwise. This principle Leibniz is quite willing to main-
tain, for:
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"N’est il pas vray que de cet axiome nous concluons, non
seulement qu’un corps qui est en repos, sera tousjours en
repos, mais aussi qu’un corps qui est en mouvement, garde-
ra tousjours ce mouvement ou ce changement, c’est à dire
la même vistesse et la même direction, si rien ne survient
qui l’empeche? Ainsi une chose ne demeure pas seulement
autant qu’il depend d’elle dans l’estat où elle est, mais
aussi quand c’est un estat de changement, elle continue à
changer, suivant tousjours une même loy."
(G.IV, p. 518)
(Is it not true that from this axiom we conclude, not only
that a body which is at rest, will always be at rest, but
also that a body which is in motion, will always protect
this motion or this change, that is the same velocity and
the same direction, if nothing occurs to impede it? Thus a
thing remains not only in as far as it depends on itself
in the state it is in, but also when it is in a state of
change, it continues to change, following always one and
the same law.)
And this is exactly what is happening to a substantial form or
soul: it follows its own law of continuous change, thus it is
changing spontaneously, as Leibniz says (G.IV, p. 518). Not
voluntarily, because it is not free to act otherwise (id., p.
519), but spontaneously, that is having its cause in itself:
its own nature forces it to change.
The law, according to which it is changing, is the general
cause of this change, but there are specific causes too. For
Bayle is right in assuming a substantial form to be indivisi-
ble, but wrong in assuming it to be simple and not complex;
the form is, in fact, complex, since it must contain all its
perceptions:
"Il faut considerer aussi que l’ame, toute simple
qu’elle
est, a tousjours un sentiment composé de plusieurs
perceptions à la fois; ce qui opere autant pour nostre
but, que si elle estoit composée de pièces, comme une
machine. Car chaque perception precedente a de l’in-
fluence sur les suivantes, conformement à une loy
d’ordre qui est dans les perceptions comme dans les
mouvements."
(G.IV, p. 522)
(It should be considered, too, that the soul, though
it is completely simple, always has a sentiment compo-
sed of various perceptions at each time; which serves
our purpose as well as if it were composed of parts
like a machine. For each preceding perception has some
influence upon those that follow, in conformity to a
law of order which holds in perceptions as well as in
movements.)
This implicates that a substance contains in fact everything
that ever has happened or will happen. Leibniz says:
"Il y a en chaque substance des traces de tout ce qui
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luy
est arrivé, et de tout ce qui luy arrivera."
(G.IV, p. 521)
(In every substance there are traces of everything
which has happened to it, and of everything which will
happen to it.)
And:
"Tout cela n’est qu’une consequence de la nature
representative de l’ame, qui doit exprimer ce qui se
passe, et même ce qui se passera dans son corps, et en
quelque façon dans tous les autres, par la connexion
ou correspondence de toutes les parties du monde."
(G.IV, p. 523)
(All this is but a consequence of the representative
nature of the soul, which has to express that which
happens, and even that which will happen in its body,
and in a certain way in all the others, through the
connection or correspondence between all the parts of
the world.)
But the reality in substances is not, as is the physical or
phenomenal world, divided in relations and particles; Leibniz
points out that there is no extension, neither spatial nor
temporal, in substances:
"Nous concevons l’etendue, en concevant un ordre dans
les
coexistences; mais nous ne devons pas la concevoir,
non plus que l’espace à la faÇon d’une substance.
C’est comme la temps, qui ne presente à l’esprit qu’un
ordre dans les changements. Et quant au mouvement, ce
qu’il y a de reel, est la force ou la puissance, c’est
à dire, ce qu’il y a dans l’estat present, qui porte
avec soy un changement pour l’avenir. Le reste n’est
que phenomenes et rapports."
(G.IV, p. 523)
(We conceive of extension, conceiving of an order in
coexistences; but we should not conceive of it, any
more than of space, in the way [we conceive] of a
substance. It is as with time, which only presents to
the spirit an order in the changes. And concerning
motion, that which is real in it, is the force or the
power, that is to say, that which is in the present
state which carries with it a change for the future.
The rest is nothing but phenomena and relations.)
This explains why a substance is both simple and indivisible,
and complex; it represents the totality of the world, but
exactly as a totality: there are no relations in it - since
relations presuppose a specific point of view, which is not
proper to the totality - there is only relatedness. Similarly,
there is no extension in it, since extension implicates an
order of succession; for the totality all is happening "at
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once" (that is: as one event, but not in time, since the
totality encompasses time) and there is no order - order is
relative and belongs, therefore, to the physical or phenomenal
world of particles and relations. There is indeed change and
thus order; not, however, in the substance, but of it: that
which it contains does not change, but its state does. This is
due to the activity of primitive force: the nature of the
substance brings about that the state of the substance is a
state of continuous change, as explained above (and will be
further explained in section 2). The body a substance is
permeating takes a point of view according to the state of its
substance (and vice versa); when it moves, from one point of
view to the other, this is of course relative, but exactly
because of this it expresses the relatedness - it is, therefo-
re, giving physical existence to primitive force viz. in the
mode of derivative forces.
This whole explanation is more or less repeated in Leibniz’s
second reply (1702), but some details and some metaphysical
principles, which he added, make this reply explain the con-
tents and consistency of his system even clearer than the
first. The terms are still the same, except that in this text
Leibniz occasionally uses "monad" to refer to the unity
brought about by the substantial form or soul; the term itself
is not new (one can find it e.g. with Giordano Bruno, and
also, infrequently, in Leibniz’s earliest works, in several of
his letters, and, for the first time in a published text, in
De ipsa natura of 1698) and neither is the concept it expres-
ses, viz. substantial form. Leibniz gives its definition in
this text in passing:
"[...] et en effect, je considere les ames, ou plustost
les Monades, comme des Atomes de substance [...]."
(G.IV, p. 561)
([...] and indeed I regard the souls, or rather the
monads, as the atoms of substance [...]) (35).
(For the complete definition, see section 2 below.)
Leibniz explains his system, making use of some metaphysical
principles.
The first is introduced as follows:
"Il est vray que le monde n’est pas un composée d’un
nombre fini d’atomes, mais plustost comme une machine
composée dans chacune de ses parties d’un nombre veri-
tablement infini de ressorts; mais il est vray aussi,
que celuy qui l’a faite, et qui la gouverne, est d’une
perfection encor plus infinie, puisqu’elle va à une
infinité de Mondes possibles, qu’il a dans l’entende-
ment et dont il a choisie celuy qui luy a plû."
(G.IV, p. 556)
(It is true that the world is not one compounded of a
finite number of atoms, but rather as a machine com-
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pounded in each of its parts of a truly infinite num-
ber of springs; but it is also true, that he who has
made it, and who governs it, is of a yet more infinite
perfection, since it comes from an infinity of possi-
ble worlds, which are in his understanding, and from
which he has chosen that which has pleased him.)
In passing, Leibniz remarks here that this world, which God
has created, is the best (since it pleases God) of other
possible worlds. Since there is a true infinity of possible
worlds, and since God has complete knowledge of them all and
could create them, he is infinitely perfect. Which, in turn,
means that the products of his creation must be as perfect as
possible: therefore, our world is the best possible. Leibniz
makes use of this principle to explain or rather to defend his
concept of universal harmony:
"Quelle merveille donc, que tout aille bien et avec
justesse? puisque toutes choses conspirent et se con-
duisent par la main, depuis qu’on suppose que ce tout
est parfaitement bien conçu."
(G.IV, p. 560)
(What wonder then, that all goes well and just? since
all things conspire and lead each other by the hand,
once one supposes that this whole has been perfectly
well conceived.)
The other passing remark in the first quotation is that the
world resembles a machine, which in every part has an infinite
number of "springs" (springs referring to elasticity, that is
in substances or monads the primitive force of action and
resistance). In the other reply reviewed above, Leibniz makes
a similar statement, viz. that one must acknowledge:
"[...] l’infini en tout, et l’exacte expression du plus
grand dans le plus petit, jointe à la tendence de
chacun à se developper dans un ordre parfait [...]."
(G.IV, p. 524)
([...] the infinite in everything, and the exact ex-
pression of the greatest in the smallest, combined
with the tendency of each to develop itself in a per-
fect order [...].)
According to Leibniz, the universal harmony, that is, the
world as a totality, is represented in every part of the
world. Therefore, since the world is infinite, the infinite is
in each of its parts; since the world is arranged or ordered
in universal harmony, this infinite order must be expressed in
every part of the world; and since order means change, this
expression of the infinite means the development of each thing
in a perfect order; development by itself, for it represents
exactly the totality, thus expressing also the universal
activity in its own way (36).
In his second reply, Leibniz repeats this, remarking that
the world, may resemble a machine or "automaton", but is in
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fact compound of things with souls (which automata or machines
lack) that is with primitive force or universal activity:
"D’ailleurs ce n’est pas dans le merveilleus de la
supposition que consiste ce qu’un Philosophe doit
objecter aux automates, mais dans le defaut des prin-
cipes, puisqu’il faut par tout des Entelechies; et
c’est avoir une petit idée de l’Auteur de la Nature
(qui multiplie, autant qu’il se peut, ses petits Mon-
des, ou ses miroirs actifs indivisibles), que de n’en
donner qu’aux corps humain. Il est même impossible
qu’il n’y en ait par tout."
(G.IV, p. 557)
(Besides, it is not on account of the wonderfulness of
the supposition that a philosopher should object to
automata, but on account of the failure of principles
since it is necessary that Entelechies are everywhere;
and one holds a small idea of the Author of nature
(who multiplies as much as he can his little worlds,
or his active indivisible mirrors) if one only gives
them to human bodies. It is even impossible that they
are not everywhere.)
Leibniz’s use of terms as "little worlds" and "active indivi-
sible mirrors" (37) obviously refers to the exact expression
of the harmonious universe in its parts mentioned above, while
"entelechies" refers to the proper force or activity of each
monad representing the universal activity in its own way.
The expression of the universe in the substantial forms or
souls of the bodies it consists of is not only exact, it is
also complete (which is, of course, ultimately demanded by its
being exact, as Leibniz points out):
"De plus, les corps n’estant pas des atomes, mais es-
tant
divisibles et divisés même à l’infini, et tout en
estant plein, il s’ensuit que le moindre petit corps
reçoit quelque impression à part du moindre changement
de tous les autres, quelques eloignés et petits qu’ils
soyent, et doit estre ainsi un miroir exact de l’uni-
vers: ce qui fait qu’un esprit assés penetrant pour
cela pourroit, à mesure de sa penetration, voir et
prevoir dans chaque corpuscule ce qui se passe et se
passera dans ce corpuscule, ce qui se passe et se
passera par tout, et dans ce corpuscule et au dehors."
(G.IV, p. 557)
(On top of this, the bodies not being atoms, but being
divisible and divided even to the infinite, and eve-
rything being full of them, it follows that the very
smallest body receives some impression from the
slightest change in all the others, however distant
and small they may be, and must thus be an exact mir-
ror of the universe; which brings about that a spirit,
sufficiently penetrating for this, could, in proporti-
on to its penetration, see and foresee in each corpus-
cle what happens and will happen in this corpuscle,
45
what happens and will happen everywhere, and in this
corpuscle as well as outside it.)
It is in this way, that the circular structure of Leibniz’s
system fits together the infinity of the number of physical
bodies, the infinity of the contents or representative nature
of their monads, the ’external’ universal harmony as well as
the ’internal’ order of development which represents it, the
physical motion, and the substantial activity. At that, it
should be observed Leibniz conceives of the universe as inclu-
ding its extension in both space and time, or rather - for
neither time nor space are absolute - as spatially and tempo-
rally extended. Both its history and its future are included
in the universe as a totality; since thus every possible
single event is included in and represented by the composite
parts of the universe, it seems that Leibniz’s system only
allows for a rigid metaphysical determinism: all has been pre-
established, and there is no possibility that something diffe-
rent could happen (38). This, however, is not quite the case.
When Leibniz speaks of determinism, he refers only to the
physical world, where rules indeed a rigid mechanical determi-
nism. Everything has been pre-established, therefore substan-
ces spontaneously express what necessarily must be expressed,
and thus:
"[...] le mouvement de quelque point qu’on puisse pren-
dre
dans le monde, se fait dans une ligne d’une nature
determinée, que ce point a prise une fois pour toutes,
et que rien ne luy fera jamais quitter."
(G.IV, p. 558)
([...] the motion of whatever point one could take in
the world, takes place in a line of a determined natu-
re, which this point has taken once and for all, and
which nothing can make it ever abandon.)
This nature is determined by the laws of mechanics, Leibniz
proceeds, and bodies cannot but blindly follow them; their
monads, however, do not. A body has no sentiment or pre-senti-
ment, therefore it can only move in the direction it receives
from collision with other bodies in a moment; each moment
there is only one possible result of this conflict, which
means there is no possibility at all; in short: whatever
exists cannot exist differently, since it does not exist
differently. A monad, on the other hand, does have sentiment,
etc.:
"C’est donc proprement dans l’Entelechie (dont ce point
est le point de veue) que la spontanité se trouve: et
au lieu que le point ne peut avoir de soy que la ten-
dance dans la droite qui touche cette Ligne, parce
qu’il n’a point de memoire, pour ainsi dire, ny de




(Therefore it is properly in the entelechy (of which
this point is the point of view) that the spontaneity
resides; and instead that the point cannot have but
the tendency to [move along] the rectilinear line that
touches this Line [i.e. the tangent to its curved
path] because it has no memory, so to speak, nor pre-
sentiment, the entelechy expresses the pre-established
curve itself [...].)
The laws of mechanics to which bodies respond are in fact the
totality of existing physical relations, existing in the
universe, that is, and therefore covering present, history,
and future. But a body is just the expression of this at a
specific place and time: it just exists, no wonder that it
does not and even cannot exist differently. Its substantial
form or monad, however, is the representation of all those
existing relations; therefore the rigid mechanical determinism
does not apply to it - in fact, it includes this determinism,
and precisely because of this it is acting spontaneously.
Leibniz repeats in this second reply that the state, in
which a monad perseveres, is a state of change, a "tendency"
(G.IV, p. 562). It cannot but change continuously. This ten-
dency is, however, composite:
"[...] une tendance composée, c’est à dire une multitu-
de
de pensées presentes, dont chacune tend à un change-
ment particulier, suivant ce qu’elle renferme, et qui
se trouvent en elle tout à la fois, en vertu de son
rapport essentiel à toutes les autres choses du monde.
[...] Car chaque chose ou portion de L’Univers doit
marquer toutes les autres, de sorte que l’ame, à l’e-
gard de la varieté de ses modifications, doit estre
comparée avec l’univers, qu’elle représente, selon son
point de veue et même en quelque façon avec Dieu, dont
elle represente finiment
l’infinité (à cause de sa perception confuse et impar-
faite de l’infini) plustost qu’avec un Atome mate-
riel."
(G.IV, p. 562)
([...] a composite tendency, that is a multitude of
present thoughts, each of which tends towards a parti-
cular change, deriving from that which it contains,
and which is in it all at once, by virtue of its es-
sential relation to all the other things of the world.
[...] for every thing or portion of the universe must
make all the others come out, in such a way that the
soul, with respect to the variety of its modificati-
ons, must be compared with the universe, which it
represents, according to its point of view and even in
some way to God, whose infinity it represents finitely
(because of its confused and imperfect perception of
the infinite) rather than with a material atom.)
The reason for the changing of the monads is that they must
represent and express the universe itself, which is changing,
or rather, which consists of continuous change. In this way,
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the events, which happen according to the mechanical rules
that govern the phenomena, have their ultimate cause both in
the universal harmony of the extended universe (extended
spatially and temporally, that is) and in the monads of the
material beings that perform these events, but then in a
condensed form instead of in an extended form; but both causes
are in fact the same:
"Et la raison du changement des pensées dans l’ame est
la
même que celle du changement des choses dans l’univers
qu’elle represente. Car les raisons de mecanique, qui
sont developpées dans les corps, sont reunies, et pour
ainsi dire, concentrées dans les ames ou Entelechies,
et y trouvent même leur source."
(G.IV, p. 562)
(And the reason for the changing of the thoughts in
the soul is the same as that for the changing of the
things in the universe it represents. For the reasons
of mechanics, which are developed in the bodies, are
united and, so to speak, concentrated in the souls or
entelechies, and even have their source there.)
Again, Leibniz obviously refers to the circular structure that
makes the complementary relation between the intensional
reality of the monads and the extensional reality of the
mechanical phenomena intelligible (39). This same structure
explains why the representation of the universe in the monads
is exact and complete, as well as imperfect and confused: the
universe is represented "tout à la fois", all at once, which
means that there is no extensional determination (one cannot
tell the infinite multitude of things and relations apart, so
to speak) (40) - to have such a determination the monad
needs its material beings, specifically its point of view,
which in turn negates the intensional totality by expressing
it in a specific way; this complementarity brings the univer-
sal harmony into existence. Furthermore, this complementarity
accounts for the phenomenal extension of the universe: the
existence of extensional determination; it entails that no
point of view is exactly the same as any other, therefore the
universe consists of an infinite number of portions or parts -
which is, of course, one of Leibniz’s presuppositions.
In passing, Leibniz remarks that this must have certain
consequences for a logic which must agree with this ontologi-
cal system:
"Il est vray que, suivant ma definition de l’espece, je
n’appelle pas cette difference specifique; car comme,
selon moy, jamais deux individus ne se ressemblent
parfaitement, il faudroit dire que jamais deux indivi-
dus ne sont d’une même espece; ce qui ne seroit point
parler just."
(G.IV, p. 566)
(It is true that, following my definition of species,
I do not call this difference [i.e. the necessary
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difference between a point of view and accordingly a
material being, and any other] specific; for since,
according to me, two individuals never resemble each
other perfectly, it should be said that two individu-
als never are of one and the same species; which would
not be speaking in a just way.)
The complementarity is, in yet another way, also present in
space and time, as Leibniz points out. The universe as a
totality, which is one event and is accordingly represented
simply and indivisibly in the monads, is potentially extended;
potentially, for it requires the complementary material beings
to actualize its being extended (41). This potential extension
is rendered in the mathematical concepts of space and time:
space and time are then continuous and indifferent to any
division. In this mathematical way, space and time are ideal:
"Je reconnois que le temps, l’etendue, le mouvement, et
le
continu en general de la maniere qu’on les prend en
Mathematique, ne sont que des choses ideales, c’est à
dire, qui expriment les possibilités, tout comme font
les nombres. [..] Mais pour parler juste, l’Etendue
est l’ordre des coexistences possibles, comme le Temps
est l’ordre des possibilités inconsistentes, mais qui
ont pourtant de la connexion. Ainsi l’un regarde les
choses simultanées ou qui existent ensemble, l’autre
celles qui sont incompatibles et qu’on conçoit pour-
tant toutes comme existentes, et c’est qui fait qu’el-
les sont successives. Mais l’Espace et le Temps pris
ensemble font l’ordre des possibilités de tout un
Univers, de sorte que ces ordres (c’est à dire l’Espa-
ce et le Temps) quadrent non seulement à ce qui est
actuellement, mais encor à ce qui pourroit estre mis à
la place, comme les nombres sont indifferens à tout ce
qui peut estre res numerata. Et cet enveloppement du
possible avec l’Existent fait une continuité uniforme
et indifferente à toute division."
(G.IV, p. 568)
(I acknowledge that time, extension, motion, and con-
tinuity in general as taken in Mathematics, are not-
hing but ideal things, that is to say, which express
the possibilities, exactly as do numbers. [...] But to
speak in an exact way, Extension is the order of pos-
sible coexistences, as Time is the order of inconsis-
tent possibilities, but which still are connected.
Thus the one regards the simultaneous things or those
which exist together, the other [regards] those which
are incompatible and which one can nonetheless concei-
ve as existing, and this is what makes the order of
possibilities of one whole universe, in such a way
that these orders (that is to say Extension and Time)
bring into one order not only that which actually
exists, but also that which could be put in its place,
as numbers are indifferent to anything which can be
res numerata [numbered things]. And this inclusion of
the possible with the existent makes a continuity,
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uniform and indifferent to every division.)
The phenomenal extension, on the other hand, is not per-
fectly continuous, neither spatially nor temporally, since it
results in each case (that is in each material being at a
specific place and time) from a specific expression of the
universe, which is completely different from any other speci-
fic expression (see above). But since this is also in each
case a specific expression of the universe as a totality, from
which the mathematical concept of continuity is derived, the
phenomenal extension must be open to the application of mathe-
matical laws and concepts such as continuity:
"Et quoyque dans la nature il ne se trouve jamais des
changements parfaitement uniformes, tels que demande
l’idée que les Mathematiques nous donnent du mouve-
ment, non plus que des figures actuelles à la rigueur
de la nature de celles que la Geometrie nous enseigne,
parce que le monde actuel n’est point demeuré dans
l’indiferrence des possibilités, estant venu à des
divisions ou multitudes effectives, dont les resultats
sont les phenomenes qui se presentent et qui sont
variés dans les moindres parties: neantmoins les phe-
nomenes actuels de la nature sont menagé et doivent
l’estre de telle sorte, qu’il ne se rencontre jamais
rien, où la loy de la continuité [...] et toutes les
autres règles les plus exactes des Mathematiques soi-
ent violées."
(G.IV, p. 568)
(And although in nature there is never a perfectly
uniform change, such as the idea, which Mathematics
gives us of motion, demands, nor actual figures of the
rigorous nature of those which Geometry teaches us,
because the actual world has not remained in the in-
difference of possibilities, having come at effective
multitudes or divisions, of which the phenomena, which
present themselves and which are different up to their
smallest parts, result; nonetheless the actual pheno-
mena of nature are accommodated, and must be, in such
a way, that it never occurs that the law of continuity
[...] and all the other most exact rules of Mathema-
tics are violated.)
Thus, the phenomenal or physical world is not continuous,
strictly speaking, but in fact discontinuous, since actual
change demands discontinuity. But since all the discontinuous
changes must compound a totality (as the pre-established
harmony demands) which is as such continuous, the universe is
continuous on account of its being composed of discontinuous
changes, as it is indeed discontinuous on account of its parts
compounding a continuous totality. Continuity and discontinui-
ty are thus necessarily complementary.
Section 2. Force and action.
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In "De ipsa natura sive de vi insita actionibusque creaturum,
pro dynamicis suis confirmandis illustrandisque." (On nature
itself or on the inherent force and actions of created things,
to confirm and illustrate their dynamics.), published in Acta
Eruditorum of September 1698, Leibniz clarifies his concepts
of force and action, especially within his system of pre-
established harmony. He does this in answering two questi-
ons. Firstly, in what does the nature consist we usually
ascribe to the things. And subsequently, whether there is in
the creatures a certain energy (G.IV, p.504). As concerns the
first question, Leibniz’s use of the term "soul" to refer to
the inherent force or nature, that is, the substantial form of
material beings, could give rise to the erroneous view that
his system were pan-theistic, or that his souls or forms were
endowed with intelligence or wisdom. Leibniz makes quite clear
he holds no such view:
"[...] de ipsa natura [...] assentior quidem, nullam
dari
animam Universi; concedo etiam, miranda illa, quae
occurrunt quotidie, de quibus dicere merito solemus,
opus naturae esse opus intelligentiae, non esse ad-
scribenda creatis quibusdam Intelligentiis, sapientia
et virtute proportionali ad rem tantam praedi-
tis[...]."
(G.IV,p.504)
([...] as concerns nature itself, I emphatically as-
sent that there is no world soul; I even concede that
the wonderful things which daily occur, of which we
justly usually say that the work of nature is the work
of intelligence, are not to be ascribed to certain
created Intelligences, endowed with as much wisdom and
power as is proportional to the matter [...].)
On the other hand, Leibniz also rejects the view that
nature could be completely understood by conceiving it as a
mere mechanism; one must distinguish
"[...] in ipso mechanismo principia a derivatis: ut in
explicando horologio non satis est, si mechanica rati-
one impelli dicas, nisi distinguas, pondere an elastro
concitetur."
(G.IV,p.505)
([...] in this mechanism the principles from the deri-
vatives: as it is not enough, in explaining a clock,
if one says that it is impelled by a mechanical cause,
unless one distinguishes whether it is incited by
weight or by springs.) (42)
Leibniz does not take a middle position, but combines the
two views, thus sublating them, in holding that there is
active force created in bodies, which ’incites’ their mechani-
cal motion, representing the harmonious totality of the uni-
verse and thus expressing the predetermined order. He clari-
fies this by examining causality in nature as a whole.
The key question to be asked is how the eternal law, which
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rules mechanical motion, once established by God when he
created the universe, affects the bodies at any time
(G.IV,p.506).
"Quaero enim, utrum volitio illa vel jussio, aut si
mavis
lex divina olim lata extrinsecam tantum tribuerit
rebus denominationem, an vero aliquam contulerit im-
pressionem creatam in ipsis perdurantem, vel [...]
legem insitam (etsi plerumque non intellectam creatu-
ris, quibus inest) ex qua actiones passionesque conse-
quantur."
(G.IV,pp.506-507)
(For I ask, whether this volition or command, or if
you like divine law, once established has given only
an extrinsical denomination to the things, or whether
it has truly brought about in them a created impressi-
on which endures within them, or [...] an inherent law
(even if usually not understood by the creatures in
which it inheres) from which follow the actions and
passions.)
The former view, viz. that divine law works extrinsically, is
that of the Occasionalists, says Leibniz; he himself adheres
to the latter (G.IV,p.507).
An important indication ("indicium insigne") for his view
to be the true one is the existence of the principle according
to which the same quantity of power is conserved, Leibniz
remarks (id.,pp. 506-507). But this is an effect rather than
a cause: it follows from the fact, that divine law endures
within the material beings. Leibniz’s explanation of this fact
is the following.
If the laws of mechanics affected the bodies extrinsically,
they would have no other agent than God himself (since there
is nothing but bodies and God; which is, of course, a proper
mechanicist supposition Leibniz is making). This entails that
God would have to effectuate these laws at every moment; which
is in fact the very view the Occasionalists hold. But Leibniz
rejects this, not only because it implicates that God would be
in fact a clumsy craftsman, who did not construct a perfect
machine, but also because it implies that the effect of ex-
trinsical affection does not last, which means that God would
be perpetually active yet accomplishing nothing which endures
(G.IV,p.507). The main point Leibniz makes here, is:
"Certe si nihil creaturis impressum est [...] si res
perinde post ipsum fuere affectae, ac si nullum jussum
intervenissit, consequens est (cum connexione aliqua
inter causam et effectum opus sit, vel immediata, vel
per aliquod intermedium) aut nihil fieri nunc consen-
taneum mandato, aut mandatum tantum valuisse in prae-
sens, semper renovandum in futurum [...].
(G.IV,p.507)
(Surely if nothing has been impressed upon the creatu-
res [...], if a thing has been affected after this
[divine command or law], as if no command had interve-
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ned, it follows (since it is necessary that there is
some connexion between cause and effect, either imme-
diate or mediated by something) either that nothing
happens now which consents to this command, or that
this command was valid only in the present, and needs
perpetually to be renewed in the future.)
Leibniz argues, it appears,that either everything happens
according to a law, in which case this law must endure, or
that there is no law at all, but only occasional causation. If
the latter is the case, there is no actual totality but only a
succession of non-related single events. These events may be
related in God’s understanding, but even then the totality is
still extrinsical, that is separated from the actual world.
The very concept of actual totality demands, therefore, in-
trinsical causality, which is a representation of the totality
itself. Laws must inhere in the material beings themselves; in
any other way the totality would be extrinsical.(In this view
one must, therefore, also reject the existence of any other
matter or substance, which would be the agent that effectuates
the laws, besides ’ordinary matter’. That Leibniz is conscious
of this, appears from his rejection of a world soul or intel-
ligences, mentioned above.) (43)
In this way, the assumption of substantial form or primiti-
ve force, of a representative nature, follows from the concept
of actual totality:
"Sin vero lex a Deo lata reliquit aliquod sui expressum
in
rebus vestigium [...] jam concedendum est, quandam
inditam esse rebus efficaciam, formam vel vim, qualis
naturae nomine a nobis accipi solet, ex qua series
phaenomenorum ad primi jussus praescriptum consequere-
tur."
(G.IV,p.507)
(But if the law established by God truly leaves somet-
hing which expresses its trace in the things [...]
then it must be conceded that a certain activity has
been put into the things, a form or force, such as we
usually give the name nature, from which follows the
series of phenomena according to the first prescribed
command.)
Leibniz realizes that one other way to conceive of actual
totality and intrinsical causality is Spinoza’s concept of
nature. In Leibniz’s system the substance of things consists
of the force of acting and suffering or resisting
(G.IV,p.508); this force endures, as do the material beings of
which it is the substantial form or representative nature. In
Spinoza’s concept, however, it follows that
"[...] nullam substantiam creatam, nullam animam eandem
numero manere, nihilque adeo a Deo conservari, ac
proinde res omnes esse tantum evanidas quasdam sive
fluxas unius divinae substantiae permanentis modifica-
tiones et phasmata, ut sic dicam; et quod eodem redit,
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ipsam naturam vel substantiam rerum omnium Deum esse,
qualem pessimae notae doctrinam nuper scriptor quidem
subtilis, at profanus, orbi invexit vel renovavit."
(G.IV,pp.508-509)
([...] no created substance, no same soul remains in
number, and hence nothing is conserved by God, and
therefore all things are only certain evanescent or
flowing modifications and, so to speak, apparitions of
the one divine permanent substance; and that, which
comes down to the same thing, the nature itself or the
substance of all things is God, which most ill-reputed
doctrine recently an author, no doubt subtle, but
profane, has introduced to the world or renewed.)
Though Leibniz may have his doubts on account of religious
considerations too, it seems to be primarily the vanishing of
an actual multitude of active beings, which accordingly have
each their proper individual active nature, that makes him
reject Spinozism. The concept of individual substance is,
according to Leibniz, incompatible with Spinoza’s concept of
one universal substance. The same goes for activity: a univer-
se which consists of, and indeed exists as, a multitude of
individual and enduring active forms, is, according to Leib-
niz, incompatible with the Spinozistic universe; in the Spino-
zistic universe there is only one activity flowing into vari-
ous vanishing forms, thus excluding any foundation of actual
individuality or existence "in number", that is as an actual
multitude. It is very obvious that Leibniz is opposed to
Spinoza’s monistic concept of substance or matter (44), for
his final remark is:
"Sane si res corporales nil nisi materiale continerent,
verissime diceruntur in fluxu consistere, neque habere
substantiale quicquam, quemadmodum et Platonici olim
recte agnovere."
(G.IV,p.509)
(Indeed if corporeal things would contain nothing but
something material, they can most truly be said to
consist of a flux, and to have nothing substantial
whatsoever, as long ago even the Platonists have
rightly acknowledged.)
If corporeal things were only material, Leibniz reasons, that
is, if they had no inherent individual activity, they would
not last, and therefore would not be able to be the subjects
of divine law. Consequently, totality could only be extrinsi-
cal. Therefore, corporeal things, that is the things which
exist in the physical or phenomenal reality, cannot be this
one-dimensional; they must be material as well as substantial.
Leibniz’s position would be a weak one indeed, if his
concept of active material beings could be rejected easily.
Therefore he needs to clarify this concept, which he does
subsequently in the second half of this text, which concerns
the second question mentioned above, viz. the question about
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energy:
"Altera quaestio est, utrum creaturae proprie et vere
agere sint dicendae?"
(G.IV,p.509)
(The other question is, whether it must be said that
the created things are active truly and properly.)
This "other question" is twofold: Leibniz has to clarify
both that material beings are indeed active, and that this
activity is individual. He leaves no doubt about his view in
this matter:
"Quantum ego mihi notionem actionis perspexisse videor,
consequi ex illa et stabiliri arbitror receptissimum
philosophiae dogma, actiones esse suppositorum; idque
adeo esse verum deprehendo, ut etiam sit reciprocum,
ita ut non tantum omne quod agit sit substantia singu-
laris, sed etiam ut omnis singularis substantia agat
sine intermissione, corpore ipso non excepto, in quo
nulla umquam quies absoluta reperitur."
(G.IV,p.509)
(As far as I think to have fathomed the concept of
action, I deem that there follows from it and is esta-
blished by it the most widely accepted philosophical
dogma, that actions are inherent to that which sub-
sists [viz. to substances]; and hence I hold it to be
true, that this is even reciprocal, viz. that not only
everything which acts is an individual substance, but
also that every individual substance acts without
intermission, the body itself not excluded, in which
absolute rest is never found.)
It should be observed that "quies" (rest) is not the opposite
of "motio" (motion), but of "actio" (action), according to
Leibniz. Motion is something phenomenal (see the preceding
chapter), but Leibniz is discussing the foundation of the
phenomena here. This means that the emphasis here is
on metaphysical concepts and relations rather than on physical
or phenomenal ones (which does, as a consequence of the reci-
procal relation between metaphysics and physics, not mean that
what is physical or phenomenal is totally excluded).
Leibniz points out that, once one has accepted and under-
stood the concept of force being the concept of the nature of
material beings, the question concerning their activity is
reduced to the question concerning their force, for there can
be no action without an active force and there can be no
active force or potency without it being exercised. However,
there is a difference between action and force:
"Quia tamen nihilominus actio et potentia res sunt




(Since, however, action and potency are different
things, the former something successive, the latter
something permanent, we must also consider action;
[...].)
That potency or force is permanent is a statement Leibniz has
made before; it is, in his system, evident that this must be
so, since force is the nature of material beings, that is
their enduring (and, if no miracle occurs, everlasting) form.
Action, however, does not have the same kind of permanence; it
is successive by nature. This successivity does not refer to
the external changes which succeed each other, but to the
immanent activity ("actiones [...] immanentes"), as Leibniz
emphasizes (G,IV,pp.509-510).
In order to clarify his concept of this immanent successive
activity Leibniz first explains its relation to the concepts
of matter and substances or monads, and subsequently its
relation to motion and space.
In the first part of this explanation Leibniz starts from
the inertia of bodies. They resist change, or rather have a
tendency to persevere in the series of changes which they have
once begun. Since this is in fact a form of activity, and
since this activity cannot derive from extension, nor be modes
of passivity (which is mass, "moles") Leibniz concludes that
there must be found in every corporeal substance a primary
entelechy or primitive motive force,
"[...] quae praeter extensionem (seu id quod est mere
geometricum) et praeter molum (seu id quod est mere
materiale) superaddita, semper quidem agit, sed tamen
varie ex corporum concursibus per conatus impetusve
modificatur."
(G.IV,p.511)
([...] which, superadded to extension (or what is
purely geometrical) and to mass (or what is purely
material) certainly acts always, modificated, however,
in various ways by the concourse of bodies through a
conatus or impetus.)
Leibniz is here, in fact, repeating what he had said in SpDyn
I. It should be observed, that the immanent activity or the
exertion of primitive force is not as such of a physical or
phenomenal nature, since it has transformed into physical
existence only as conatus or impetus. Physical or phenomenal
entities may appear for a certain time (however short) and
then disappear again completely; not so metaphysical entities:
they endure. This becomes particularly apparent in the second
part of this clarification.
In this second part Leibniz starts with motion. At a given
moment of its motion, a body is not only occupying a quantity
of space of its proper size,
"[...] sed etiam conatum habet seu nisum mutandi locum,
ita ut status sequens ex praesenti, per se, naturae vi
consequatur; alioqui praesenti momento (atque adeo
momento quovis) corpus A quod movetur a corpore B
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quiescente nihil differet, sequereturque [...] nullum
plane discrimen in corporibus fore, quandoquidem in
pleno uniformis per se massae discrimen, nisi ab eo
quod motum respicit, sumi non potest."
(G.IV,p.513)
([...] but also has a conatus or nisus to change [its]
location, in such a way that the state, following from
the present, by itself, is a consequence of the force
of [its] nature; otherwise body A which at the present
moment (and therefore at any moment whatever) is mo-
ving, would differ nothing from body B, which is res-
ting, and it would follow [...] that there would be no
distinction whatever between bodies, since it cannot
be assumed that there is a distinction in a plenum of
mass, uniform in itself, unless by something which
concerns motion.)
It is clear that Leibniz holds that the immanent activity of
substances distinguishes them from one another. Motion, accor-
ding to Leibniz, cannot furnish such a principle of individua-
lization, if it is conceived as being extrinsical (that is as
a body being now in this place, and the next moment in anot-
her) but only if it is conceived as being intrinsical (and
therefore as activity) and thus as enduring change.
Obviously, space as such does not differentiate itself,
according to Leibniz, for to be at a location is not enough to
be distinguished from being at another location. This is
consistent with Leibniz’s rejection of the concept of absolute
space (and time); spatial location, therefore, cannot extrin-
sically determine substances. As a consequence, motion, con-
ceived as a succession of locations and thus as being extrin-
sical, cannot determine substances. The same goes for all
extrinsical denominations of this kind, such as shape
(G.IV,p.513). Leibniz holds that determination is essentially
intrinsical, that is, that it is the activity of the substan-
ces themselves. In the preface to the Theodicy (published
1710), Leibniz repeats the main point, referring to the text
reviewed here:
"[...] que s’il n’y avait rien que de passif dans les
corps, leurs différents états seraient indiscerna-
bles."
(Th.,p.56)
([...] that if there were nothing but passivity in the
bodies, their different states would be indiscerna-
ble.)
The activity, then, is the intermediate between the sub-
stantial form or representative nature of a material being and
its actual existence as an individual material being in the
multitude of individual material beings. The representative
nature contains the divine law according to which the actual
totality is ordered; since by virtue of this nature the sub-
stance represents the actual totality, it is this divine law,
viz. primitive force. However, this nature is as such not yet
actually differentiated; as a force it has yet to be exerci-
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sed. In order to be exercised it needs its passive complement,
viz. matter. Matter, or to be precise, primary matter is not
actually differentiated either, it is the recipient of the
primitive force or substantial form. The actualization of
matter receiving form, and thus of establishing an actually
active individual being, is brought about by the successive
activity. Thus a monad is established:
"Atque hoc ipsum substantiale principium est, quod in
viventibus anima, in aliis forma substantialis appel-
latur, et quatenus cum materia substantiam vere unam,
seu unum per se constituit, id facit quod ego Monadem
appello, [...]."
(G.IV,p.511)
(And it is this substantial principle itself, which is
called soul in living things, in other things substan-
tial form, and inasmuch as it constitutes with matter
a substance , which is truly one, or a "unum per se"
[unity by itself], it establishes what I call a Monad
[...].)
All these concepts are metaphysical by nature; a monad is not
a phenomenal or physical entity. Physical entities are infini-
tely divisible, a monad is an indivisible unity (45). A monad
is a complete substance, that is it unifies activity and
passivity and is thus both general (representing tha actual
totality) and individual (expressing it by its own activity).
Its actual existence as an individual is expressed as its
immanent successive activity; immanent, since it derives from
its representative nature and thus is able to act as an agent
or subject of divine law (that is, able to express the actual
totality in its individual way) (46). Therefore, if one were
to break up the concept of a complete substance or monad into
its constituent logical parts, which are indeed its ontologi-
cal moments (which, one should note, do not possess existence,
not even metaphysically, as such, but only as a compound
totality) the following structure would appear.
First: There is an actual totality which is represented as
such in the soul or substantial form or nature of the monad.
This representation is of a truly universal nature and not yet
differentiated (which distinguishes it from the existent
actual totality).
Second: This represented totality is, by virtue of its
active nature (that is the representation of the self-determi-
nation of the actual totality) split up into passivity and
activity, or (primary) matter and form.
Third: Passivity and activity are unified by the immanent
activity of the monad, thus actualizing the individual being
it is, by expressing successively the moments of the permanent
representation of the totality. In this way the actual indivi-
duality is tied to the actual differentiation of the actual
totality. Consequently a multitude of individuals is existent,
together compounding the actual totality which is to be repre-
sented; this makes this structure, which evidently possesses a
circular structure, conclusive.
It is clear that this structure as such cannot be used in
physics; Leibniz, as I mentioned before, maintains this as a
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general principle. In the present text the transfer to physics
is conceptually related to the infinitesimal entities of
conatus and nisus, but Leibniz does not elaborate on this.
Leibniz does, however, draw some propositions about physi-
cal nature from his metaphysics. Since nature must be under-
stood to be compounded of monads (although not entirely so,
since there is also the corporeal matter as such), that is, of
a multitude of individuals which are distinguished from each
other, Leibniz maintains that there is no perfect similarity
anywhere in nature. And, as a consequence, that no corpuscles
of utmost hardness, no fluid of greatest thinness, nor any
subtle matter which is universally diffused, or ultimate
elements, are found in nature (G.IV,p.514).
Although it may be not quite clear how, it is clear that
monads both determine physical matter (corpuscles, bodies) and
are distinguished from it. Monads are the subjects which
exercise the laws of nature, permeating physical matter, thus
establishing nature as an actual totality of active individu-
als; somehow physical matter is the phenomenal result of this:
corporeal matter and derivative forces, which make up physical
reality; and this, in turn, is represented in the monads,
which makes the determination both conclusive and complementa-
ry.
In "Considerations sur les Principes de Vie, et sur les Natu-
res Plastiques, par l’Auteur du Système de l’Harmonie
preétablie" (Considerations on the vital principles and on the
plastic natures, by the author of the system of the pre-esta-
blished harmony), published May 1705, in the Histoire des
ouvrages des savants, Leibniz once more attempts to clarify
the distinction as well as the relation between monads (or
souls) and corporeal matter, in criticising Cartesian and
Occasionalist views.
"Ainsi selon mon Systeme, les Ames ou les principes ne
changent rien dans le cours ordinaire des corps, et ne
donnent pas même à Dieu occasion de le faire. Les Ames
suivent leur loix, qui consistent dans un certain
developpement des perceptions selon les biens et les
maux; et les corps suivent aussi les leurs, qui con-
sistent dans les regles du mouvement: et cependant ces
deux Estres d’un genre tout à fait different, se ren-
contrent ensemble et se repondent comme deux pendules
parfaitement bien reglées sur le même pied, qouyque
peutestre d’une construction toute differente."
(G.VI,pp.540-541)
(Thus, according to my system, the Souls or vital
principles do not change anything in the ordinary
course of bodies, and do not even give God the occasi-
on to do so. The Souls follow their laws, which con-
sist in a certain development of perceptions according
to goods and evils; and the bodies follow also theirs,
which consist in the rules of motion: and yet these
two Beings of a totaly different kind accord together
and respond to each other as two pendulums, perfectly
regulated to the same pace, although maybe of a totaly
different construction.)
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Therefore, souls and bodies being apart to the extent that
they follow their own laws, a body never receives a change in
motion except through another moving body, which pushes it
(G.VI, p.541). Indeed, soul and body are apart, but :
"[...] les ames ne sont jamais separées de tout corps
organique; quoyqu’il soit vray cependant qu’il n’y a
point de portion de la matiere, dont on puisse dire,
qu’elle est tousjours affectée à la même ame."
(G.VI,p.545)
([...] the souls are never separated from every orga-
nical body; though it may be true nonetheless, that
there is no portion of matter of which one can say
that it always belongs to the same soul.)
Leibniz is discussing animal bodies and souls here, but on
principle this statement should hold for any matter and form
or monad whatsoever, since all true unities are indivisible
and indestructible, therefore in the same degree "detached"
from physical matter (organical or otherwise). (In fact Leib-
niz states that a human soul is not substantially different
from an animal soul or the soul of any other body; if it were,
there would be a "vacuum formarum", as he points out;
G.VI,p.543). Souls do not immediately affect bodies; or, in
general, monads do not immediately affect corporeal matter;
this much is evident from this text (as it is from several of
Leibniz’s other texts) (47). But both, souls and bodies, or
monads and matter, fit in the same overall pattern, and toge-
ther they compound the actual totality.
Section 3. Conclusions.
In this chapter I have reviewed Leibniz’s texts on the clari-
fication of substance and activity, published between 1696 and
1710. It is clear that he maintained his system of pre-esta-
blished harmony consistently during this period (as far as one
can judge from the texts above) but elaborated several de-
tails.
The main concepts of pre-established harmony are totality,
individuality, representation, and expression. The actual
totality of nature, which consists of an infinite multitude of
acting bodies (in fact, it is their monads which act; the
bodies themselves only move), can only be an actual totality
if these bodies are related. In his metaphor of the clocks
(see section 1), Leibniz provides us with three competitive
models of this relatedness: influence, assistance, and pre-
established harmony. He rejects the first and the second, and
maintains the third model. In this model relatedness is in-
trinsical: it is established by virtue of the representation
of the totality in each of its parts. The logical relation
between these parts and the totality is of a circular nature:
the totality consists of related parts, because its parts
represent this totality and consequently are related. This
logical relation is elaborated by Leibniz in his concepts of
law (see section 2).
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In order to enable the substance to be the acting subject
of the law (or laws) which interrelate totality in itself, the
representation of totality must be both exact and complete.
Exact, because without a perfect similarity with the actual
totality this representation would not establish actual rela-
tedness: the parts would not fit together. Complete, because
the law, which is to be effectuated, must endure within the
parts (see section 2). Therefore, this subject must include
the totality completely and exactly. Consequently, since the
world is infinite, the infinite is in each of its parts; the
order of the world is expressed by each of its parts; and the
self-incitation and self-determination of the world is also
represented in each of its parts. Thus each part of the world
incites itself into the activity which brings about the order
of changes which compound the world. As a figure of speech:
each part "repeats" the total history and present and future
of the world, but does so at the same moment this history and
present and future come into existence (see section 1).
In this way, totality and its parts are exactly and comple-
tely identical, but for one crucial distinction: the parts do
not include the totality in its extended form, since their
successive changes have yet to form this extension, thereby
expressing it (see section 1). At this point one must, accor-
ding to Leibniz, distinguish between several moments or
aspects of the actual totality.
The first distinction is that between extension as such and
that which is extending.
Extension as such is time and space, that is the order of
inconsistent possibilities (which are connected, thus succes-
sive) and the order of possible coexistences, respectively.
Taken together, time and space form a continuum which is
indifferent to any division whatever; that is, it can be
"filled up" with anything which extends (48). Time and space,
therefore, have no reality of their own; they are ideal and
can be operated with mathematically and geometrically (see
section 1). Motion, therefore, conceived as the temporal
succession of spatial locations, does not have discriminating
or individualizing potency any more than time and space do
(see section 2).
That which is extending is corporeal matter, which is
"filling up" the continuum mentioned above and is, accordin-
gly, infinitely divisible and in fact divided, and therefore
consists of an infinite multitude of bodies.
Now bodies are in fact individuals; not, however, on ac-
count of their corporeal matter (which is merely filling up
the continuum of space and time and which has, as such, no
more discriminating potency than space and time have) but by
virtue of their monads. Differentiated in space and time,
bodies are the existent physical reality, compounding the
extended, actual totality. In a merely spatial perspective the
multitude of bodies present what is coexistent, in a merely
temporal perspective they present what is successive; if one
puts these perspectives together, they present the extended
totality, but only as a multitude of singular events, that is
only as the expression of the total relatedness. As Leibniz
says, bodies follow blindly the laws of nature, they possess
no sentiment or pre-sentiment of their own. What is actually
relating them, is the immanent activity and primitive force of
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their monads. The concept of corporeal matter refers to a
specific body being at a specific place and a specific time;
the concept of monads refers to the totality which encompasses
all this specificality, making it one whole instead of a
multitude of singular events. Bodies, by moving according to
physical laws, express the totality, but they do not represent
it themselves, which their monads do.
Thus, when one comes to speak of monads, one enters the
realm of metaphysics, which sublates the singularity of the
physical bodies and the particularity of the relations between
them, and refers to the universality of it all.
Monads represent the totality exactly and completely. The
totality is the related multitude of bodies in motion. The
motion of bodies is as such specific; but the representation
of the totality of motion, which is not yet differentiated,
is, therefore, absolute. This "absolute motion" is, as a
consequence, both the potency to move or change, and actual
motion or change, because it represents motion or change as
such. This is primitive force. Force needs to be exercised,
that is, its components (potency and actual activity) must
have existence. Therefore Leibniz makes the distinction be-
tween active and passive primitive force, that is the potency
(including its general actualization) to act and to receive
action (which is to suffer; hence passive force, which is
primary matter). In order to be actually combined, and thus to
make force be exercised, they must represent the actual diffe-
rentiation of the totality - for they are nothing but the
representation of actual motion, which is in fact differentia-
ted. Yet they must preserve their representation of totality
as such. This is established in the concept of activity (see
section 2). This activity expresses the successive changes
which are included in a yet undifferentiated way in the primi-
tive force; thus the exertion of this force by the activity
establishes the individuality of a monad: it actualizes the
specifity which distinguishes it from all other monads.
One may conclude, then, that in Leibniz’s system of the
pre-established harmony every determinating activity is media-
ted by the monads by virtue of their representative nature.
The ultimate foundation of the phenomena is the actual totali-
ty itself; not, however, in a linear reductive way, but in a
way which has a circular nature on account of the reciprocal
relation between the monad (as representing the actual totali-
ty) and the actual totality itself. The distinction between
metaphysical and physical or phenomenal entities is based on
the fact that metaphysical entities (as the monads and their
immanent force and activities) refer to and indeed include
representatively the actual totality, whereas physical or
phenomenal entities as such are of a singular nature. Metapho-
rically Leibniz refers to this distinction with the terms
"sentiment" or "pre-sentiment", and "blind" respectively, as
well as the terms "permanent" and "enduring", "conservation",
etc. for metaphysical entities, whereas physical or phenomenal
entities are only "momentary" and "vanishing". This accounts
fot Leibniz’s statement that, although monads are always
related to distinct portions of corporeal matter, these porti-
ons do not always belong to the same monad.
62
Part 2. Systematic exposition
As has been demonstrated in the preceding part, monad and body
are one whole which includes its internal distinction; the
dynamical essence of this is the distinction between primitive
force (which is the representation of the universe by the
complete substances) and derivative forces (which are the
expression of the universe by the complete substances). Logi-
cally, Leibniz’s system must contain a structure in which this
distinction between expression and representation (and the
unity of this distinction) is conceptualized. Therefore, in
this second part, I intend to establish the implicit structure
of Leibniz’s system inasfar as it is concerned with force. The
exposition of this structure (in chapter 3) should make it
possible to establish the logical and ontological essence of
this part of Leibniz’s philosophy (which is the subject of
chapter 4).
The structure which is expounded in chapter 3 arises from both
reconstruction and interpretation. Leibniz himself never
explicated the structure as such of his system; in his letters
and essays he treated specific problems, sometimes a wide
range of problems covering virtually all of his system, but
never covering it entirely and certainly not to the extent
that he explicitly presented the structure which underlies it
all. Nevertheless I assume that such a basic structure can be
found; in order to demonstrate this I will test, starting from
the basic concept of complete substances, whether this assumed
basic structure really connects the other fundamental concepts
and in doing so establishes the meaning they actually have
according to Leibniz. For it is clear from the various essays
(which I treated in the preceding part) which concepts are
fundamental and what is their meaning; this can be established
with satisfactory historical reliability. If the assumed basic
structure is compatible with the systematic meaning of these
concepts, I think one may conclude justly that one has arrived
at the structure of the system. To this, however, only syste-
matic, not historical, reliability is applicable. Hence the
division in two parts, the preceding historical part and the
subsequent systematic part.
I do not pretend to present, then, in the following chap-
ters an exclusively Leibnizian structure. For I will try to
establish a structure which is not only compatible with the
meaning of the fundamental concepts of Leibniz’s system, but
which also furnishes a foundation of the system as a whole. In
this, my basic assumption is that an ontological system (as
Leibniz’s system is) can only be conclusive on the condition
that it includes a basic ontological relation which applies to
both being and thought.
This basic ontological relation consititutes the essence of
the foundation of the system as a whole. In Leibniz’s system,
I think it is obvious that one should seek this basic ontolo-
gical relation in the striking similarity between notio com-
pleta and complete substance. There is, however, no text that
I know of in which Leibniz identifies the two on account of a
relation common to both of them. Yet, as I will demonstrate in
this part, this basic ontological relation makes his system
conclusive. But since it cannot be proved that Leibniz himself
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arrived at this relation, nor that he endeavoured to constitu-
te a foundation for his system as a whole, much less that he
took the structural similarity between notio completa and
complete substance as a starting point for it, I will confine
myself to pointing out that the structure implied in the
concept of complete substances is a basic structure which
makes the system conclusive. On account of this restriction,
it is clear that the following part is much more than the
preceding part an interpretation and reconstruction. This part
will be mainly of a synthetical nature - in contrast to the
preceding historical exposition, which is mainly analytical -
since it is to a great extent an interpretative and systematic
reconstruction of Leibniz’s system. Reconstruction requires
interpretation and the basis for this interpretation is fur-
nished by the preceding part. In some instances I will here
make use of a wider range of Leibniz’s works, viz. unpublished
essays and letters from the same period, than is covered in
part 1. However, it is clear that this kind of amplification
should not exceed the basis of part 1 which it seeks to sup-
plement; otherwise there would be an undesirable gap between
the first and the second part. Therefore I will use this
supplementary material only as circumstantial evidence and
leave the historical basis of part 1 to be the core of the
argument.
Summarizing: I intend to present the structure which I
think makes Leibniz’s system conclusive and which I think is,
therefore, implied by and included in it; I cannot prove and I
do not intend to prove that Leibniz thought likewise, but I do
intend to demonstrate that this structure is both compatible
with the basic concepts of the Leibnizian system and makes it
conclusive, thus demonstrating that this structure is the
foundation of the system.
In the exposition in the chapters 3 and 4 the following method
is applied. Starting from the assumed basic structure as such,
I analyze it part by part in order to make clear its constitu-
ent elements. But these elements do not stand by themselves,
they are only analytical moments; ultimately, it is their
synthesis as the basic structure as a whole which presents
their meaning. In the analysis, therefore, each partial analy-
sis is concluded by a synthesis of the analysed elements, and
the analysis as a whole is concluded by the final synthesis.
In chapter 3, these subsequent moments of synthesis are
presented in diagrams; the analytical moments are the entities
featuring in each diagram. Furthermore, all diagrams before
the last one must be considered as analytical moments of this
final diagram; for itself each diagram is a synthetic whole,
but as part of the overall analysis and synthesis each diagram
is an analytical moment.
It should be observed, then, that none of the analytical
moments are considered to be independent ontological entities;
only the ultimate complete circular structure has as such
ontological significance, viz. as a process with a circular
nature.
In chapter 4, the distinguished logical elements are analy-
tical moments also; the ultimate structure of hyperception is
the synthesis of these elements.
This choice of method of exposition is not arbitrary. I
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want to make clear a basic structure which is circular. In a
circular structure end and starting point are the same; yet,
if presented in this way, nobody would know that which lies
between end and starting point, hence nobody would be able to
see that which makes the structures circular. In order to make
the circularity clear, then, one must break it; this is the
analysis. But also one has to point out the circularity in
which the analytical moments appear; this is the synthesis.
